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Abstract
To improve national security, government agencies have long been committed to enforcing powerful
surveillance measures on suspicious individuals or communications. In this paper, we consider a wireless
legitimate surveillance system, where a full-duplex multi-antenna legitimate monitor aims to eavesdrop
on a dubious communication link between a suspicious pair via proactive jamming. Assuming that the
legitimate monitor can successfully overhear the suspicious information only when its achievable data
rate is no smaller than that of the suspicious receiver, the key objective is to maximize the eavesdropping
non-outage probability by joint design of the jamming power, receive and transmit beamformers at the
legitimate monitor. Depending on the number of receive/transmit antennas implemented, i.e., single-input
single-output, single-input multiple-output, multiple-input single-output and multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO), four different scenarios are investigated. For each scenario, the optimal jamming power is
derived in closed-form and efficient algorithms are obtained for the optimal transmit/receive beamforming
vectors. Moreover, low-complexity suboptimal beamforming schemes are proposed for the MIMO case.
Our analytical findings demonstrate that by exploiting multiple antennas at the legitimate monitor, the
eavesdropping non-outage probability can be significantly improved compared to the single antenna case.
In addition, the proposed suboptimal transmit zero-forcing scheme yields similar performance as the
optimal scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communications provide an efficient and convenient means for establishing connections
between people. However, due to the open and broadcast nature of the wireless medium, wireless
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1communications are particularly susceptible to security breaches, hence establishing reliable and
safe connections is a challenging task. Responding to this, physical layer security, as a promising
technique to enable secure communications, has attracted considerable attentions in recent years
[1]–[15], and various sophisticated techniques such as artificial noise [16], [17] and security-
oriented beamforming [18], [19] have been proposed to enhance the secrecy performance.
In the physical layer security framework, the eavesdroppers are illegitimate adversaries, who
intend to breach the confidentiality of a private conversation. On the other hand, wireless com-
munications also facilitate the collaboration between the criminals or terrorists, thereby posing
significant threats on national security. Therefore, to prevent crimes or terror attacks, there is a
strong need for the government agencies to legitimately monitor any suspicious communication
links to detect abnormal behaviors, such as communications containing sensitive word combina-
tions, addressing information, or other factors with a frequency that deviates from the average.
For wireless communication surveillance, passive eavesdropping, where the legitimate monitor
simply listens to the suspicious links, is a straightforward method. However, the legitimate monitor
may be in general deployed far away from the suspicious transmitter to avoid getting exposed, as
such the quality of the legitimate eavesdropping channel is a degraded version of the suspicious
channel, making passive eavesdropping an inefficient approach. To circumvent this issue, a novel
approach, namely proactive eavesdropping via cognitive jamming, was proposed in [20], [21],
where the legitimate monitor, operating in a full-duplex manner, purposely transmits jamming
signals to moderate the suspicious communication rate to improve the eavesdropping efficiency.
Later in [22], the authors proposed three possible spoofing relay strategies to maximize the
achievable eavesdropping rate.
In order to enable full-duplex operation, the legitimate monitor is equipped with two antennas,
one for eavesdropping and the other for jamming. Also, an ideal assumption, namely, perfect self-
interference cancellation, is adopted in [20], [21]. However, residual self-interference is likely to
exist due to practical constraints such as hardware impairment [23]. Under this realistic scenario,
how to properly handle the self-interference becomes a critical issue to be tackled. In this paper, we
propose to adopt multiple antennas at the legitimate monitor for performance enhancement. The
2motivation of using multiple antennas is two-fold, namely, enabling self-interference mitigation in
the spatial domain and adjusting the effective jamming power observed at the suspicious receiver.
For the considered multi-antenna wireless legitimate surveillance systems, we study the optimal
joint design of jamming power and beamforming vectors. To reduce the complexity, intuitive
suboptimal beamforming schemes are also proposed, and the achievable eavesdropping non-outage
probability of the proposed schemes are examined.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• Depending on the number of receive/transmit antennas implemented at the legitimate monitor,
i.e., single-input single-output (SISO), single-input multiple-output (SIMO), multiple-input
single-output (MISO) and multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO), four different scenarios
are studied. For each case, the optimal jamming power is derived in closed-form. In addition,
employing the semidefinite relaxation (SDR) technique, the efficient algorithms are obtained
for the optimal transmit/receive beamforming vectors.
• Three low-complexity suboptimal beamforming schemes are proposed, namely, transmit zero-
forcing (TZF)/ maximum ratio combing (MRC), maximum ratio transmission (MRT)/ receive
zero-forcing (RZF), and MRT/ MRC. Closed-form expressions for the eavesdropping non-
outage probability of TZF/MRC and MRT/RZF schemes are derived. In addition, simple and
informative high SNR approximations of all suboptimal schemes are presented.
• The findings of the paper suggest that, deploying multiple antennas is an effective means to
enhance the system performance. Also, the optimal joint jamming power and beamforming
scheme outperforms the proposed suboptimal schemes, the performance gap is rather insignif-
icant compared with the TZF/MRC scheme, and gradually diminishes when the maximum
jamming power becomes large. In addition, full diversity can be achieved by the MRC
scheme, while the RZF attains a lower diversity since one degree of freedom is used for
self-interference cancellation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes in detail the system
model and formulates the optimization problem. Section III presents the optimal solutions. Subop-
timal schemes are proposed in Section IV. Numerical results and discussions are given in Section
3V. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper and summarizes the key outcomes.
Notation: We use bold upper case letters to denote matrices, bold lower case letters to denote
vectors and lower case letters to denote scalars. || · ||, (·)†, (·)−1 and tr(·) denote Euclidean norm,
conjugate transpose operator, matrix inverse and the trace of a matrix, respectively. E{x} stands
for the expectation of the random variable x and Prob(·) denotes the probability. Ik is the identity
matrix of size k. O(·) denotes the infinitesimal of the same order. Γ(x) is the gamma function
[24, Eq. (8.31)] and Γ (α, x) is the upper incomplete gamma function [24, Eq. (8.350.2)].
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a three-node point-to-point legitimate surveillance system as shown in Fig. 1, where
a legitimate monitor E aims to eavesdrop a dubious communication link between a suspicious
pair S and D via jamming. It is assumed that the suspicious transmitter and receiver are equipped
with a single antenna each.1 To enable simultaneous eavesdropping and jamming, the legitimate
monitor is equipped with two sets of antennas, i.e., Nr antennas for eavesdropping (receiving)
and Nt antennas for jamming (transmitting). Quasi-static channel fading is assumed, such that
the channel coefficients remain unchanged during each transmission block but vary independently
between different blocks.
Fig. 1. A point-to-point legitimate surveillance system consisting of one suspicious transmitter
S, one suspicious receiver D and one legitimate monitor E.
1Although the current work focuses on the single antenna scenario, the developed approaches can be easily extended to the
general multiple antenna scenario.
4The received signal at the suspicious receiver D can be expressed as
yD =
√
PShsds+ hedwtx+ nd, (1)
where PS denotes the transmit power of the suspicious transmitter, hsd is the channel coefficient
of the S → D link which is a zero-mean complex Gaussian random variable with variance λ1. The
1×Nt vector hed denotes the jamming channel between E and D, whose entries are identically and
independently distributed (i.i.d.) zero-mean complex Gaussian random variables with variance λ3
and wt is the transmit beamforming vector at the legitimate monitor with ||wt|| = 1. In addition, s
is the information symbol with unit power, while x denotes the jamming symbol with E{|x|2} = pd
satisfying 0 ≤ pd ≤ PJ where PJ denotes the maximum jamming power. Finally, nd is the zero-
mean additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with variance ND.
Similarly, the received signal at the legitimate monitor E is given by
yE =
√
PShses+
√
ρHeewtx+ ne, (2)
where the Nr × 1 vector hse denotes the channel coefficient of the S → E link with entries
being i.i.d. zero-mean complex Gaussian random variables with variance λ2. As in [23], [25], the
residual self-interference channel is modeled by
√
ρHee, where the Nr×Nt matrixHee denotes the
fading loop channel with entries being i.i.d. zero-mean complex Gaussian random variables with
variance λ4 and ρ (0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1) parameterizes the effect of passive self-interference suppression.
Finally, ne is the zero-mean AWGN noise at the legitimate monitor with E{nen†e} = NEINr .
We assume that E employs a linear receiver wr with ||wr|| = 1 for signal detection, as such,
yE = w
†
ryE =
√
PSw
†
rhses+
√
ρw†rHeewtx+w
†
rne. (3)
Therefore, the end-to-end signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at the suspicious receiver
SINRD and the legitimate monitor SINRE can be respectively expressed as
SINRD =
PS|hsd|2
pd|hedwt|2 +ND and SINRE =
PS|w†rhse|2
ρpd|w†rHeewt|2 +NE
. (4)
We assume that global channel state information (CSI) is available at the legitimate monitor
52, while the suspicious transmitter and receiver only know the CSI of the suspicious link. This
assumption is practical since it is difficult for the suspicious transmitter to know the existence
of the legitimate monitor. To ensure reliable detection at D, the suspicious transmitter varies the
transmission rate according to SINRD. Hence, if SINRE ≥ SINRD, the legitimate monitor can also
reliably decode the information. On the other hand, if SINRE < SINRD, it is impossible for the
legitimate monitor to decode the information without any error. Therefore, we adopt the following
indicator function to denote the event of successful eavesdropping at the legitimate monitor as in
[20] :
X =

 1 if SINRE ≥ SINRD,0 otherwise, (5)
where X = 1 and X = 0 denote eavesdropping non-outage and outage events, respectively. Note
that the indicator function X is irrespective of the transmit power PS at the suspicious transmitter.
As in [20], we adopt the eavesdropping non-outage probability as the performance metric.
Hence, the main objective is to maximize the eavesdropping non-outage probability E{X} by
jointly optimizing the receive and transmit beamforming vector wr, wt and the jamming power
pd. Hence, the optimization problem can be formulated as
(P1) : max
wr,wt,pd
E{X}
s.t. 0 ≤ pd ≤ PJ & ||wr|| = ||wt|| = 1. (6)
III. OPTIMAL DESIGN
In this section, we present optimal solutions for the optimization problem (P1). In particular,
we investigate four different scenarios depending on the number of receive/transmit antennas
implemented at the legitimate monitor. For each scenario, the optimization problem (P1) is
reformulated and the optimal solution is obtained.
2The CSI can be obtained by utilizing the methods given in the literature [20], [22].
6A. Single-Input Single-Output (SISO)
We start with the SISO case, which serves as a baseline scheme for comparison and as a useful
guideline for the multiple-antenna cases. Since the legitimate monitor is equipped with a single
transmit and receive antenna, i.e., Nt = Nr = 1, self-interference can not be eliminated in the
spatial domain but can be suppressed via proper jamming power design. As such, the optimization
problem (P1) reduces to
(P2) : max
pd
E{X} = Prob
(
PS|hse|2
ρpd|hee|2 +NE ≥
PS|hsd|2
pd|hed|2 +ND
)
s.t. 0 ≤ pd ≤ PJ . (7)
Note that problem (P2) is non-convex in general, since its objective function is not concave
over the jamming power pd. However, problem (P2) can be reformulated as
(P3) : min
pd
|hsd|2
pd|hed|2 +ND −
|hse|2
ρpd|hee|2 +NE
s.t. 0 ≤ pd ≤ PJ . (8)
Then we have the following result:
Theorem 1: For the SISO scenario, the optimal jamming power can be expressed as
pd =


PJ if


∆1 > 0 ∆2 > 0 and
∆2
∆1
≥ PJ
∆1 = 0 ∆2 > 0
∆1 < 0

 ∆2 ≥ 0∆2 < 0 and ∆2∆1 < PJ and ρND|hse|2|hee|2ρPJ |hee|2+NE ≤ NE |hsd|2|hed|2PJ |hed|2+ND
0 if


∆1 ≥ 0 ∆2 ≤ 0
∆1 < 0 ∆2 < 0


∆2
∆1
≥ PJ
∆2
∆1
< PJ and
ρND |hse|2|hee|2
ρPJ |hee|2+NE >
NE |hsd|2|hed|2
PJ |hed|2+ND
∆2
∆1
if ∆1 > 0 and ∆2 > 0 and
∆2
∆1
< PJ ,
(9)
where ∆1 = |hed|2 −
√
ρ|hsd||hed||hee|
|hse| and ∆2 =
|hsd||hed|√
ρ|hee||hse|NE − ND. Proof: Define f(x) =
7|hsd|2
x|hed|2+ND −
|hse|2
ρx|hee|2+NE with 0 ≤ x ≤ PJ . The first order derivative of f(x) can be expressed as
f ′(x) = − |hsd|
2|hed|2
(x|hed|2 +ND)2
+
ρ|hee|2|hse|2
(ρx|hee|2 +NE)2
. (10)
To this end, the desired results can be obtained along with some separate treatments for different
cases, for which the details are omitted for brevity. 
Note that the optimal jamming strategy depends on the relationship between the channel gains
and noise powers. If jamming introduces higher level of interference power at the suspicious
receiver than the self-interference power at the legitimate monitor, it is always beneficial to use
full power to confuse the suspicious receiver. As for the scenario where the legitimate monitor can
already overhear from the suspicious transmitter successfully without jamming or jamming causes
higher self-interference at the legitimate monitor, it is better to remain silent. For some special
scenarios that jamming causes non-monotonic influence on the eavesdropping performance, there
exists an additional optimal power allocation point that achieves the best performance.
B. Single-Input Multiple-Output (SIMO)
We now consider the SIMO case. With multiple receive antennas, it is possible to mitigate the
self-interference in the spatial domain, i.e., via the zero-forcing combining. However, complete
elimination of the self-interference does not necessarily yield the highest effective SINR. Therefore,
it is desirable to find the optimal receive combining vector. To do so, we first reformulate the
original optimization problem (P1) as
(P4) : max
pd,wr
Prob
(
PS|w†rhse|2
ρpd|w†rhee|2 +NE
≥ PS|hsd|
2
pd|hed|2 +ND
)
s.t. 0 ≤ pd ≤ PJ & ||wr|| = 1. (11)
To maximize the objective function of problem (P4), we find out that, for fixed pd, it is sufficient
to maximize
|w†rhse|2
ρpd|w†rhee|2+NE
. Since this is a generalized Rayleigh ratio problem [26], the optimal
8receiving vector can be obtained in closed-form as
wr =
(
ρpd
NE
heeh
†
ee + INr
)−1
hse
||
(
ρpd
NE
heeh
†
ee + INr
)−1
hse||
. (12)
Then, substituting wr into (11) and applying the Sherman Morrison formula [27], problem (P4)
can be reformulated as
(P5) : min
pd
NE |hsd|2
pd|hed|2 +ND +
ρpd
NE
|h†sehee|2
1 + ρpd
NE
||hee||2
s.t. 0 ≤ pd ≤ PJ . (13)
Therefore, the remaining task is to find the optimal jamming power pd, which we do in the
following.
Theorem 2: For the SIMO case, the optimal jamming power is given by
pd =


PJ if


∆1 > 0 ∆2 > 0 and
∆2
∆1
≥ PJ
∆1 = 0 ∆2 > 0
∆1 < 0

 ∆2 ≥ 0∆2 < 0 and ∆2∆1 < PJ and ρND|h†sehee|2ρPJ ||hee||2+NE ≤ NE |hsd|2|hed|2PJ |hed|2+ND
0 if


∆1 ≥ 0 ∆2 ≤ 0
∆1 < 0 ∆2 < 0


∆2
∆1
≥ PJ
∆2
∆1
< PJ and
ρND |h†sehee|2
ρPJ ||hee||2+NE >
NE |hsd|2|hed|2
PJ |hed|2+ND
∆2
∆1
if ∆1 > 0 and ∆2 > 0 and
∆2
∆1
< PJ ,
(14)
where ∆1 = |hed|2 −
√
ρ|hsd|2|hed|2
|h†sehee|2
||hee||2 and ∆2 =
√
|hsd|2|hed|2
ρ|h†sehee|2
NE − ND. Proof: Define
g(x) = NE |hsd|
2
x|hed|2+ND +
ρx
NE
|h†sehee|2
1+ ρx
NE
||hee||2 with 0 ≤ x ≤ PJ . The first order derivative of g(x) can be
computed as
g′(x) = − NE |hsd|
2|hed|2
(x|hed|2 +ND)2
+
ρ
NE
|h†sehee|2(
1 + ρx
NE
||hee||2
)2 . (15)
9To this end, the desired results can be obtained along with some separate treatments for different
cases, for which the details are omitted for brevity. 
Note that for the special case Nr = 1, Theorem 2 reduces to Theorem 1.
C. Multiple-input Single-output (MISO)
In this subsection, we focus on the MISO case. Different from the SIMO case, where the receive
vector design only affects the effective SINRE, the transmit beamforming vector will affect both
SINRE and SINRD, hence it is more challenging to design.
To start with, substituting (4) into (6), problem (P1) can be alternatively expressed as
(P6) : max
pd,wt
Prob
(
PS|hse|2
ρpd|heewt|2 +NE ≥
PS|hsd|2
pd|hedwt|2 +ND
)
s.t. 0 ≤ pd ≤ PJ & ||wt|| = 1. (16)
With simple algebraic manipulations, problem (P6) can be equivalently formulated as
(P7) : min
pd,wt
ρpd|heewt|2 +NE
pd|hedwt|2 +ND
s.t. 0 ≤ pd ≤ PJ & ||wt|| = 1. (17)
To this end, we have the following important observation:
Lemma 1: For the MISO case, it is always optimal to use the full jamming power, i.e., pd = PJ .
Proof: Capitalizing on the technique presented in [23, Lemma 4], the claim can be established.

Therefore, the remaining task is to optimize wt. Let W , wtw
†
t and ignore the rank-one
constraint for the moment, then problem (P7) can be relaxed as:
(P8) : min
W
ρPJ tr
(
Wh†eehee
)
+NE
PJ tr
(
Wh
†
edhed
)
+ND
(18)
s.t. tr (W) = 1 (18a)
W  0. (18b)
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It is easy to observe that problem (P8) is a fractional semidefinite programming (SDP), which
can be converted into an equivalent linear SDP through the Charnes-Cooper transformation [28].
Specifically, introducing a new variable Z = sW, where s > 0 satisfies s
(
PJ tr
(
Wh
†
edhed
)
+ND
)
=
1. Then multiplying the numerator and the denominator of the objective function by s, the fractional
SDR of problem (P8) becomes a convex SDP as follows
(P9) : min
Z,s
ρPJ tr
(
Zh†eehee
)
+ sNE (19)
s.t. s > 0 (19a)
tr (Z) = s (19b)
PJ tr
(
Zh
†
edhed
)
+ sND = 1 (19c)
Z  0. (19d)
Problem (P9) is a convex SDP problem that consists of a linear objective function with a set
of linear constraints. Therefore, the optimal solution can be efficiently solved using the standard
CVX tools [29]. Then, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 2: The fractional quasi-convex problem (P8) attains the same optimal objective value
as that of problem (P9). Furthermore, if (Z∗, s∗) is the optimal solution of (P9), then Z
∗
s∗
is the
optimal solution of (P8). Proof: The proof can be established by using a similar technique
proposed in [30], [31]. Hence, it is omitted for brevity. 
Recall that the rank-one constraint has been neglected in problem (P9). Hence, to establish the
optimality of the solution, we need to verify the rank of the optimum Z, which we show in the
following theorem:
Theorem 3: The optimal solution Z of problem (P9) is always rank one. Proof: See
Appendix A. 
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D. Multiple-input Multiple-output (MIMO)
Now we turn our attentions to the most general MIMO case. Substituting (4) into (6), problem
(P1) can be alternatively expressed as
(P10) : max
pd,wr,wt
Prob
(
PS|w†rhse|2
ρpd|w†rHeewt|2 +NE
≥ PS|hsd|
2
pd|hedwt|2 +ND
)
s.t. 0 ≤ pd ≤ PJ & ||wr|| = ||wt|| = 1. (20)
To proceed, we rewrite problem (P10) as
(P11) : min
pd,wr,wt
|hsd|2
pd|hedwt|2 +ND −
|w†rhse|2
ρpd|w†rHeewt|2 +NE
s.t. 0 ≤ pd ≤ PJ & ||wr|| = ||wt|| = 1. (21)
Then, following the same argument as Lemma 1, it can be shown that using full jamming power is
always optimal. Similarly, noticing that the item
|w†rhse|2
ρpd|w†rHeewt|2+NE
in (21) is a generalized Rayleigh
ratio problem, which can be globally maximized when
wr =
(
ρpd
NE
Heewtw
†
tH
†
ee + INr
)−1
hse
||
(
ρpd
NE
Heewtw
†
tH
†
ee + INr
)−1
hse||
. (22)
Hence, problem (P11) can be reformulated as
(P12) : min
wt
NE
ND
|hsd|2
1 + PJ
ND
|hedwt|2
+
ρPJ
NE
|h†seHeewt|2
1 + ρPJ
NE
w
†
tH
†
eeHeewt
s.t. ||wt|| = 1. (23)
The optimization problem (P12) is non-convex because of the complex objective function. To
proceed, we first introduce an auxiliary variable y as
y = 1 +
PJ
ND
|hedwt|2 = 1 + PJ
ND
tr
(
Wh
†
edhed
)
. (24)
Apparently, y ∈ [1, ymax], where ymax is the maximum eigenvalue of matrix INt + PJNDh
†
edhed, i.e.,
ymax = 1 +
PJ
ND
||hed||2.
12
Then, employing the SDR technique, problem (P12) can be relaxed as
(P13) : min
W
ρPJ
NE
tr
(
WH†eehseh
†
seHee
)
1 + ρPJ
NE
tr
(
WH
†
eeHee
) + NEND |hsd|2
y
(25)
s.t. y = 1 +
PJ
ND
tr
(
Wh
†
edhed
)
(25a)
tr (W) = 1 (25b)
W  0, (25c)
where the rank-one constraint is omitted. Note that when y is fixed, problem (P13) becomes a
quasi-convex optimization problem, which can be converted into a convex SDP problem after some
transformations. Hence, problem (P13) can be solved by the two-stage optimization procedure [32],
where the inner stage is a SDP problem with fixed y, while the outer stage is a one dimensional
line search problem over y.
In particular, the one dimensional problem is formulated by
(P14) : min
y
f(y) +
NE
ND
|hsd|2
y
s.t. 1 ≤ y ≤ 1 + PJ
ND
||hed||2, (26)
where f(y) is the optimal value of the inner optimization problem (P15) presented below:
(P15) : min
Z,s
ρPJ
NE
tr
(
ZH†eehseh
†
seHee
)
(27)
s.t. s > 0 (27a)
tr (Z) = s (27b)
s+
ρPJ
NE
tr
(
ZH†eeHee
)
= 1 (27c)
PJ
ND
tr
(
Zh
†
edhed
)
= s(y − 1) (27d)
Z  0, (27e)
where we have used the same technique as in problem (P8) by introducing a new variable Z = sW,
where s > 0 satisfies s+ ρPJ
NE
tr
(
sWH†eeHee
)
= 1.
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Problem (P15) consists of a linear objective function with a set of linear constraints, hence is a
convex SDP problem that can be efficiently solved. Recall that the SDR technique was applied to
facilitate the derivation. Hence, it remains to check whether the solution of problem (P15) satisfies
the rank-one constraint. Then we have the following important result:
Theorem 4: The optimal Z of problem (P15) is guaranteed to be rank-one. Proof: See
Appendix B. 
IV. SUBOPTIMAL DESIGN FOR THE MIMO CASE AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In the previous section, we have studied the optimal design for the MIMO case. However,
the resulting solution requires one dimensional search and SDP, hence involves high computation
complexity. Motivated by this, in this section, we propose three low-complexity suboptimal beam-
forming design schemes. In addition, a detailed analysis on the exact eavesdropping non-outage
probability of the corresponding systems is presented.
A. SISO Case
We start by investigating the achievable performance of the SISO case, which serves as a
baseline scheme for comparison, and we have the following result:
Theorem 5: For the SISO case, the exact eavesdropping non-outage probability of the system
is given as
E{X} = 1+
(
λ1NE
PJ(ρλ1λ4 − λ2λ3) −
ρλ1λ2λ3λ4
(ρλ1λ4 − λ2λ3)2
)
exp
(
ND
λ3PJ
+
λ1NE
λ2λ3PJ
)
Γ
(
0,
ND
λ3PJ
+
λ1NE
λ2λ3PJ
)
− ρλ
2
1λ4NE
(ρλ1λ4 − λ2λ3)(λ1NE + λ2ND)+
ρλ1λ2λ3λ4
(ρλ1λ4 − λ2λ3)2
exp
(
ND
λ3PJ
+
NE
ρλ4PJ
)
Γ
(
0,
ND
λ3PJ
+
NE
ρλ4PJ
)
.
(28)
Proof: See Appendix C. 
Theorem 5 presents a closed-form expression for the eavesdropping non-outage probability,
which is valid for arbitrary system configuration. Nevertheless, the expression does not provide
much insightful information. Motivated by this, we look into the high SNR regime and derive
an asymptotic approximation for the system, which enables the characterization of the achievable
diversity order.
14
In conventional physical layer security literatures, a common assumption in the asymptotic high
SNR regime is that the main-to-eavesdropper ratio (MER) λde → ∞ (i.e., the ratio between the
reference gains of the main channel and eavesdropping channel), see for instance [33]–[36]. In
practice, this occurs when the quality of the main channel is much better than wiretap channel,
i.e., Bob is relatively close to Alice while Eve is far away from Alice or the wiretap channel
undergoes severe small-scale and large-scale fading effects. Similarly, we propose a new metric,
namely, eavesdropper-to-main ratio (EMR) as λed = λ2/λ1, and define the diversity order of the
system as
dEMR = − lim
λed→∞
log (P∞
out
)
log (λed)
. (29)
Lemma 3: In the high SNR regime, i.e., λed →∞, the eavesdropping outage probability of the
SISO case can be approximated as
P∞
out
=
((
ρλ4
λ3
+
NE
λ3PJ
)
exp
(
ND
λ3PJ
)
Γ
(
0,
ND
λ3PJ
)
−
ρλ4
λ3
exp
(
ND
λ3PJ
+
NE
ρλ4PJ
)
Γ
(
0,
ND
λ3PJ
+
NE
ρλ4PJ
))
× 1
λed
. (30)
Proof: See Appendix D. 
Lemma 3 indicates that the system achieves a unit diversity order. This is intuitive since only
one receive antenna is deployed at the legitimate monitor.
B. TZF/MRC Scheme
The basic idea of the TZF/MRC scheme is to exploit the multiple transmit antennas to com-
pletely eliminate the self-interference [37]. To ensure this is feasible, the number of the transmit
antennas should be greater than one, i.e., Nt > 1. In addition, MRC is applied at the receive
antennas, i.e.,
wr =
hse
||hse|| . (31)
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Hence, the optimal beamforming vector wt is the solution of the following problem
wt = argmax
wt
|hedwt|2
s.t. h†seHeewt = 0 & ||wt|| = 1. (32)
According to [38], the optimal solution can be written in closed-form as
wt =
Π1h
†
ed
||Π1h†ed||
, (33)
where the Nt×Nt matrix Π1 is defined by Π1 = INt− H
†
eehseh
†
seHee
||h†seHee||2
. Then we have the following
result:
Theorem 6: The exact eavesdropping non-outage probability of the TZF/MRC scheme can be
expressed as
E{X} = 1−
Nt−2∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!(Nt − k − 2)!
(
λ1NE
λ2λ3PJ
)Nr
×
(
ND
λ3PJ
+
λ1NE
λ2λ3PJ
)k
exp
(
ND
λ3PJ
+
λ1NE
λ2λ3PJ
)
Γ
(
Nt −Nr − k − 1, ND
λ3PJ
+
λ1NE
λ2λ3PJ
)
. (34)
Proof: See Appendix E. 
To gain further insights, we now look into the high SNR regime.
Lemma 4: In the high SNR regime, i.e., λed →∞, the eavesdropping outage probability of the
TZF/MRC scheme can be approximated as
P∞
out
=
Nt−2∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!(Nt − k − 2)!
(
ND
λ3PJ
)k
e
ND
λ3PJ Γ
(
Nt −Nr − k − 1, ND
λ3PJ
)(
NE
λ3PJ
)Nr
×
(
1
λed
)Nr
.
(35)
Proof: See Appendix F. 
From Lemma 4, we observe that the system achieves a full diversity order of Nr, indicating that
increasing the receive antenna number is an effective means to improve the system performance.
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C. MRT/RZF Scheme
In contrast to the TZF/MRC scheme, self-interference cancellation is performed at the receiver
by using RZF. To ensure this is feasible, the number of the receive antennas should be greater
than one, i.e., Nr > 1. In addition, MRT is applied at the transmit antennas, i.e.,
wt =
h
†
ed
||hed|| . (36)
Hence, the optimal beamforming vector wr is the solution of the following maximization problem
wr = argmax
wr
|w†rhse|2
s.t. w†rHeeh
†
ed = 0 & ||wr|| = 1. (37)
According to [38], the optimal solution can be written in closed-form as
wr =
Π2hse
||Π2hse|| , (38)
where the Nr ×Nr matrix Π2 is given by Π2 = INr − Heeh
†
ed
hedH
†
ee
||Heeh†ed||2
. Then we have the following
result:
Theorem 7: The exact eavesdropping non-outage probability of the MRT/RZF scheme can be
expressed as
E{X} = 1−
Nt−1∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!(Nt − k − 1)!
(
λ1NE
λ2λ3PJ
)Nr−1
×
(
ND
λ3PJ
+
λ1NE
λ2λ3PJ
)k
exp
(
ND
λ3PJ
+
λ1NE
λ2λ3PJ
)
Γ
(
Nt −Nr − k + 1, ND
λ3PJ
+
λ1NE
λ2λ3PJ
)
. (39)
Proof: The desired result can be obtained by following similar procedures as in Appendix
E. 
Since the above expression is too complicated to gain more insights, we now study the high
SNR regime.
Lemma 5: In the high SNR regime, i.e., λed →∞, the eavesdropping outage probability of the
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MRT/RZF scheme can be approximated as
P∞
out
=
Nt−1∑
k=0
(−1)k
k!(Nt − k − 1)!
(
ND
λ3PJ
)k
e
ND
λ3PJ Γ
(
Nt −Nr − k + 1, ND
λ3PJ
)(
NE
λ3PJ
)Nr−1
×
(
1
λed
)Nr−1
.
(40)
Proof: The desired result can be obtained by following similar procedures as in Appendix F.

Lemma 5 reveals that the system achieves a diversity order of Nr − 1. The reason is that one
degree of freedom is used for interference cancellation at the receive side of the legitimate monitor.
D. MRT/MRC Scheme
Finally, we consider the MRT/MRC scheme. Hence, the beamforming vectors are given by
wr =
hse
||hse|| and wt =
h
†
ed
||hed|| . (41)
It is worth pointing out that, unlike the ZF schemes, the jamming power pd needs to be optimized
due to the existence of self-interference in the MRT/MRC scheme. By following the same steps
as in Theorem 1, we have the following result:
Theorem 8: The optimal jamming power design for the MRT/MRC scheme can be expressed
as
pd =


PJ if


∆1 > 0 ∆2 > 0 and
∆2
∆1
≥ PJ
∆1 = 0 ∆2 > 0
∆1 < 0


∆2 ≥ 0
∆2 < 0 and
∆2
∆1
< PJ and
ρND |h†seHeeh†ed|2
ρPJ
|h
†
seHeeh
†
ed
|2
||hse||2
+NE ||hed||2
≤ NE |hsd|2||hed||2
PJ ||hed||2+ND
0 if


∆1 ≥ 0 ∆2 ≤ 0
∆1 < 0 ∆2 < 0


∆2
∆1
≥ PJ
∆2
∆1
< PJ and
ρND|h†seHeeh†ed|2
ρPJ
|h
†
seHeeh
†
ed
|2
||hse||2
+NE ||hed||2
> NE |hsd|
2||hed||2
PJ ||hed||2+ND
∆2
∆1
if ∆1 > 0 and ∆2 > 0 and
∆2
∆1
< PJ ,
(42)
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where ∆1 = ||hed||2 −
√
ρ|hsd||h†seHeeh†ed|
||hse||2 and ∆2 =
|hsd|||hed||2√
ρ|h†seHeeh†ed|
NE −ND.
Having obtained the optimal jamming power, we are ready to study the exact eavesdropping
non-outage probability of MRT/MRC scheme.
Theorem 9: The exact eavesdropping non-outage probability of the MRT/MRC scheme is given
by
E{X} = 1− 1(
1 + λ2ND
λ1NE
)Nr+
Nt−1∑
k=0
k∑
m=0
1
(k −m)!
∫ ∞
ND
NE
(
xNE −ND
λ3PJ
)k−m
e
−xNE−ND
λ3PJ
(
ρλ4
λ3
x
)m
(
1 + ρλ4
λ3
x
)m+1 Nr λ2λ1(
1 + λ2
λ1
x
)Nr+1dx. (43)
Proof: See Appendix G. 
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the integral in (43) does not admit a closed-form
expression. However, it can be efficiently evaluated numerically using standard software such
as Matlab or Mathematica. To gain further insights, we now look into the high SNR regime.
Lemma 6: In the high SNR regime, i.e., λed →∞, the eavesdropping outage probability of the
MRT/MRC scheme can be approximated as
P∞
out
=

(NE
ND
)Nr
−
Nt−1∑
k=0
k∑
m=0
Nr
(k −m)!
∫ ∞
ND
NE
(
xNE −ND
λ3PJ
)k−m
e
−xNE−ND
λ3PJ
(
ρλ4
λ3
)m
xm−Nr−1(
1 + ρλ4
λ3
x
)m+1 dx


×
(
1
λed
)Nr
. (44)
Proof: Invoking [24, Eq. (1.112.1)], we have(
1 +
λ2ND
λ1NE
)−Nr
=
(
NE
λedND
)Nr (
1 +O
(
1
λed
))Nr
=
(
NE
λedND
)Nr
+O
(
1
λNr+1ed
)
, (45)
and
λ2
λ1
(
1 +
λ2
λ1
x
)−(Nr+1)
=
1
xNr+1
(
1
λed
)Nr (
1 +O
(
1
λed
))Nr+1
=
1
xNr+1
(
1
λed
)Nr
+O
(
1
λNr+1ed
)
.
(46)
Then the desired result can be obtained by following similar procedures as in Appendix G. 
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Interestingly, we observe that the MRT/MRC scheme achieves a diversity order of Nr, which
is same as the TZF/MRC scheme.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, numerical results are presented to illustrate the performance of the proposed
proactive eavesdropping schemes and validate the analytical expressions. Unless otherwise specify,
the number of transmit and receive antennas at the legitimate monitor is Nt = Nr = 3, the noise
variances at both D and E are normalized such that ND = NE = 1, the self-interference coefficient
is ρ = 0.5, the average channel gains λ1, λ2, λ3 and λ4 are set to be 1, 0.1, 0.1 and 1, respectively.
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Fig. 2. Eavesdropping non-outage probability comparison for the SISO case.
Fig. 2 depicts the eavesdropping non-outage probability for the SISO case. For comparison, the
performance of the two benchmark schemes proposed in [20], [21] are also plotted, namely, 1)
Proactive eavesdropping with constant jamming power, i.e., pd = PJ , 2) Passive eavesdropping,
i.e., pd = 0. As expected, the proposed proactive eavesdropping with optimal jamming power
substantially outperforms the other two reference schemes. Moreover, we observe that for the
proactive constant-power jamming scheme, increasing the jamming power may decrease the
eavesdropping non-outage probability due to the potential severe interference inflicted on the
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legitimate monitor. In contrast, increasing the maximum jamming power is always beneficial for
the proposed proactive eavesdropping scheme with optimal jamming power.
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Fig. 3. Eavesdropping non-outage probability comparison of the MIMO, MISO, SIMO and SISO
cases.
Fig. 3 compares the achievable eavesdropping non-outage probability of the MIMO, MISO,
SIMO and SISO cases. As expected, the MIMO case always yields the best performance, while the
SISO case is the worst. Also, the MISO and SIMO cases significantly outperform the SISO case,
thereby demonstrating the potential benefit of implementing multiple antennas at the legitimate
monitor. In addition, the performance of SIMO case is in general better then the MISO case. When
the maximum jamming power is sufficiently large, the eavesdropping non-outage probability of
all multiple antenna cases approaches one. However, if the maximum jamming power is small,
the benefit of deploying multiple transmit antenna vanishes.
Fig. 4 illustrates the eavesdropping non-outage probability of the proposed suboptimal schemes.
We observe that, among the proposed suboptimal schemes, the TZF/MRC scheme achieves the
best performance, and remarkably, it has a similar performance as the optimal scheme. Also,
the performance of the MRT/MRC scheme is noticeably worse than that of the TZF/MRC and
MRT/RZF schemes with moderate maximum jamming power, which indicates the critical impor-
tance of properly handling the self-interference at the legitimate monitor. In addition, the MRC
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Fig. 4. Eavesdropping non-outage probability of the MIMO case: Optimal design v.s. Suboptimal
design.
schemes outperform the RZF scheme at low maximum jamming power region, the reason is that
in such region, the self-interference is rather insignificant, hence, it is better to utilize all the
receive antennas to enhance the quality of the desired signal, instead of sacrificing one degree of
freedom for self-interference suppression.
Fig. 5 plots the eavesdropping non-outage probability with different self-interference suppression
parameter ρ for the MIMO case. We observe that, regardless of ρ, the optimal scheme achieves
the best performance. Also, for the ZF-based schemes, the eavesdropping non-outage probability
remains constant, since both schemes can perfectly eliminate self-interference. While for the
MRT/MRC scheme, increasing ρ decreases the eavesdropping non-outage probability, and when
ρ is small, the MRT/MRC scheme tends to outperform other suboptimal schemes.
Fig. 6 investigates the eavesdropping non-outage probability with different Nt for the MIMO
case when Nt+Nr = 14. From Fig. 6(a) and Fig. 6(b), we see that, for the optimal, TZF/MRC and
MRT/RZF schemes, there exists a unique Nt which yields the best performance. However, for the
MRT/MRC scheme, the impact of Nt on the achievable performance depends heavily on λ4. With
large λ4, i.e., λ4 = 1, which corresponds to the strong self-interference scenario, it is better to
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Fig. 5. Eavesdropping non-outage probability versus self-interference suppression parameter ρ
for the MIMO case with PJ/ND = 10dB.
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Fig. 6. Eavesdropping non-outage probability versus Nt for the MIMO case with Nt +Nr = 14
and PJ/ND = 10dB.
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deploy more antennas at the receive side as shown in Fig. 6(a). On the other hand, with small λ4,
i.e., λ4 = 0.1, which corresponds to the weak self-interference scenario, the number of transmit
and receive antenna needs to be balanced. The main reason is that, with strong self-interference,
the benefit of deploying more antennas at the receive side to enhance the eavesdropping channel
capacity overweights the capacity degradation of the suspicious channel by employing the same
number of transmit antennas.
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Fig. 7. Eavesdropping outage probability versus EMR for suboptimal schemes with PJ/ND =
10dB.
Fig. 7 examines the eavesdropping outage probability with different EMR for the proposed
suboptimal schemes. We observe that both the TZF/MRC and MRT/MRC schemes achieve a
diversity order of Nr, and the MRT/RZF scheme attains a diversity order of Nr − 1, while the
SISO scheme only achieves unit diversity order, which is consistent with the analytical results
presented in section IV. In addition, the MRT/RZF scheme outperforms the MRT/MRC scheme
when the EMR is small, while becomes inferior as the EMR increases.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have studied the joint design of jamming power and transmit/receive beamforming vectors
at the legitimate monitor to maximize the eavesdropping non-outage probability. Four different
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scenarios have been considered. For each scenario, the optimal jamming power was characterized
in closed-form. Also, efficient algorithms were proposed to obtain the optimal transmit/receive
beamforming vectors. Finally, low-complexity suboptimal beamforming schemes were proposed,
and analytical expressions were derived for the achievable eavesdropping non-outage probabilities
of the suboptimal schemes. The findings suggest that adopting multiple-antenna tremendously
improves the performance of the system. Moreover, the suboptimal TZF/MRC scheme attains
similar performance as the optimal scheme, hence provides an attractive low-complexity solution
for practical implementation.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The Lagrangian multiplier function for problem (P9) can be expressed as
L (Z, s, ξ1, ξ2, ξ3,Y) = ρPJ tr
(
Zh†eehee
)
+ sNE − ξ1s+ ξ2 (s− tr (Z)) +
ξ3
(
1− sND − PJ tr
(
Zh
†
edhed
))
− tr (YZ) , (47)
where ξ1 ≥ 0, ξ2 and ξ3 denote the dual variables of problem (P9) associated with the constraints
in (19a) and (19c), respectively, while Y  0 is the matrix dual variable associated with the
constraint Z  0. Since problem (P9) is convex and Slater condition holds true, the Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are necessary and sufficient for establishing the optimality [29].
The KKT conditions for problem (P9) are
constraints (19a)–(19d) (48)
ξ1s = 0→ ξ1 = 0 (48a)
tr (YZ) = 0→ YZ = 0 (48b)
∂L
∂s
= NE − ξ1 + ξ2 − ξ3ND = 0 (48c)
∂L
∂Z
= ρPJh
†
eehee − ξ2INt − ξ3PJh†edhed −Y = 0. (48d)
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Now, multiplying (48d) by Z and utilizing (48), we have
ρPJ tr
(
Zh†eehee
)
+ sNE = ξ3, (49)
which implies that ξ3 > 0. Thus, we have
Y = ρPJh
†
eehee − (ξ3ND −NE) INt − ξ3PJh†edhed. (50)
To this end, we find it convenient to give a separate treatment for three different cases depending
on the relationship between ξ3, ND and NE .
• Case 1: ξ3ND > NE . In this case, Y is no longer semidefinite positive, which contradicts
with the assumption that Y  0.
• Case 2: ξ3ND = NE . Noticing that Y in (50) is the difference of two rank-one matrices, it
can be readily shown from Weyl’s inequalities that Y cannot be positive-semidefinite except
in the case with ξ3Ph
†
edhed = 0, i.e., ξ3 = 0 for non-zero hed, which contradicts with the
assumption ξ3ND = NE .
• Case 3: ξ3ND < NE . In this case, ρPJh†eehee−(ξ3ND −NE) INt is a full-rank positive matrix.
Multiplying (48d) by Z, we have
rank (Z) = rank
((
ρPJh
†
eehee − (ξ3ND −NE) INt
)
Z
)
= rank
((
ξ3PJh
†
edhed
)
Z
)
≤ min
(
rank
(
h
†
edhed
)
, rank (Z)
)
= 1, (51)
where the last equality follows from the fact that rank (Z) ≥ 1 with tr (Z) = s. As such, we
have rank (Z) ≥ 1 and rank (Z) ≤ 1, which implies that rank (Z) = 1.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
The Lagrangian multiplier function for problem (P15) can be expressed as
L (Z, s, ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, ξ4,Y) =
ρPJ
NE
tr
(
ZH†eehseh
†
seHee
)− ξ1s+ ξ2 (s− tr (Z)) +
ξ3
(
1− s− ρPJ
NE
tr
(
ZH†eeHee
))
+ ξ4
(
s(y − 1)− PJ
ND
tr
(
Zh
†
edhed
))
− tr (YZ) , (52)
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where ξ1 ≥ 0, ξ2, ξ3 and ξ4 denote the dual variables of problem (P15) associated with the
constraints from (27a) to (27d), respectively, while Y  0 is the matrix dual variable associated
with the constraint Z  0. Since the problem (P15) is convex and Slater condition holds true,
the KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient for optimality. The KKT conditions for problem
(P15) are
constraints (27a)–(27e) (53)
ξ1s = 0→ ξ1 = 0 (53a)
tr (YZ) = 0→ YZ = 0 (53b)
∂L
∂s
= −ξ1 + ξ2 − ξ3 + ξ4(y − 1) = 0 (53c)
∂L
∂Z
=
ρPJ
NE
H†eehseh
†
seHee − ξ2INt − ξ3
ρPJ
NE
H†eeHee − ξ4
PJ
ND
h
†
edhed −Y = 0. (53d)
Multiplying (53d) by Z and utilizing (53) yield
ρPJ
NE
tr
(
ZH†eehseh
†
seHee
)
= ξ3, (54)
which implies ξ3 ≥ 0. Thus, we have
Y =
ρPJ
NE
H†eehseh
†
seHee + (ξ4(y − 1)− ξ3) INt − ξ3
ρPJ
NE
H†eeHee − ξ4
PJ
ND
h
†
edhed. (55)
We now give a separate treatment for three different cases depending on ξ3 and ξ4.
• Case 1: ξ3 > 0 and ξ4 > 0. If ξ3 > 0, exploiting the fact that Y  0, it is easy to prove
that ξ4 > 0. If
ρPJ
NE
H†eehseh
†
seHee + (ξ4(y − 1)− ξ3) INt − ξ3 ρPJNEH†eeHee is positive definite,
multiplying (53d) by Z yields
rank (Z) = rank
((
ρPJ
NE
H†eehseh
†
seHee + (ξ4(y − 1)− ξ3) INt − ξ3
ρPJ
NE
H†eeHee
)
Z
)
= rank
((
ξ4
PJ
ND
h
†
edhed
)
Z
)
≤ min
(
rank
(
h
†
edhed
)
, rank (Z)
)
= 1. (56)
As for the case where ρPJ
NE
H†eehseh
†
seHee + (ξ4(y − 1)− ξ3) INt − ξ3 ρPJNEH†eeHee is positive
semi-definite and its smallest eigenvalue is 0, the optimal rank one solution has been presented
in [23, Appendix B].
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• Case 2: ξ3 = 0 and ξ4 > 0. In this case,
ρPJ
NE
H†eehseh
†
seHee + ξ4(y − 1)INt is a full-rank
positive matrix. Multiplying (53d) by Z, we have
rank (Z) = rank
((
ρPJ
NE
H†eehseh
†
seHee + ξ4(y − 1)INt
)
Z
)
= rank
((
ξ4
PJ
ND
h
†
edhed
)
Z
)
≤ min
(
rank
(
h
†
edhed
)
, rank (Z)
)
= 1. (57)
• Case 3: ξ3 = 0 and ξ4 = 0. In this case, Y reduces to
Y =
ρPJ
NE
H†eehseh
†
seHee, (58)
which is a rank-one matrix. Hence, the rank of the optimum Z is not guaranteed to be one.
However, it can be shown that an optimum rank-one matrix can always be recovered from
optimum Z as follows: Suppose the optimum Z is of rank r, i.e., Z =
∑r
q=1 σququ
†
q, where σq
and uq are the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the matrix Z, respectively. Due to the equality
constraint (27b),
∑r
q=1 σq = s. Substituting eigenvalue decomposition of Z into (53b) yields∑r
q=1 σqu
†
qYuq = 0. Recalling that Y  0, we have
u†qH
†
eehseh
†
seHeeuq = 0, ∀q (59)
From (27c) and (27d), we have
s+
ρPJ
NE
r∑
q=1
σqu
†
qH
†
eeHeeuq = 1, (60)
and
s(y − 1) = PJ
ND
r∑
q=1
σqu
†
qh
†
edheduq. (61)
Noticing that the objective function of problem (P15) satisfies ρPJ
NE
tr
(
ZH†eehseh
†
seHee
)
=
ξ3 = 0, i.e., f(y) = 0 in the one dimension search stage, based on (27d), the objective
function of problem (P14) becomes f(y)+
NE
ND
|hsd|2
y
=
NE
ND
|hsd|2
1+
PJ
sND
tr(Zh†edhed)
. To this end, we choose
eigenvector such that qˆ = maxq u
†
qh
†
edheduq and set σqˆ = s. Due to (59), such a choice does
not affect the value of f(y), and it is easy to verify that σqˆu
†
qˆh
†
edheduqˆ ≥
∑r
q=1 σqu
†
qh
†
edheduq,
28
which implies that such a beamforming vector design guarantees a better solution for problem
(P14). Therefore, the optimum rank-one matrix recovered from Z turns out to be σqˆuqˆu
†
qˆ.
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The expectation of random variable X is given by E{X} = Prob
(
PS |hse|2
ρpd|hee|2+NE ≥
PS |hsd|2
pd|hed|2+ND
)
,
which can be computed via
E{X} = Prob (b < c)× Prob (a < c|b < c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1
+Prob (c < b)× Prob
(
a− c
ργee
≤ PJ
NE
(b− a)
∣∣∣∣ c < b
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I2
,
(62)
where a = γsd
γse
, b = γed
ργee
, c = ND
NE
, γsd = |hsd|2, γse = |hse|2, γed = |hed|2 and γee = |hee|2.
Noticing that γsd, γse, γed and γee follow the exponential distribution with mean λ1, λ2, λ3 and
λ4, respectively, the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of random variables a and b can be
derived as
Fa(x) =
∫ ∞
0
∫ xz
0
1
λ1
e
− y
λ1
1
λ2
e
− z
λ2 dydz = 1− 1
1 + λ2
λ1
x
, (63)
and
Fb(x) =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ρxz
0
1
λ3
e
− y
λ3
1
λ4
e
− z
λ4 dydz = 1− 1
1 + ρλ4
λ3
x
. (64)
Then I2 can be divided into three parts as follows
I2 =
I3︷ ︸︸ ︷
Prob (a < c < b)× 1+
I4︷ ︸︸ ︷
Prob (c < a < b)× Prob
(
a− c
ργee
≤ PJ
NE
(b− a)
∣∣∣∣ c < a < b
)
+
Prob (c < b < a)× 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
I5
. (65)
I1 and I3 can be evaluated by
I1 + I3 = Fa(c)Fb(c) + Fa(c) (1− Fb(c)) = 1− 1
1 + λ2ND
λ1NE
. (66)
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The next step is to calculate I4, and we have
I4 = Prob
(
γsd
γse
NE −ND
γed − ργeeγsdγse
≤ PJ , ND
NE
<
γsd
γse
<
γed
ργee
)
. (67)
Averaging over γed and γee, we obtain
I4 =
∫ ∞
ND
NE
e
−xNE−ND
λ3PJ
1
1 + ρλ4
λ3
x
fa(x)dx, (68)
where fa(x) is the probability density function (pdf) of random variable a. Invoking [24, Eq.
(3.353.1)] and [24, Eq. (3.352.2)], I4 can be computed as
I4 =
ρλ1λ2λ3λ4
(ρλ1λ4 − λ2λ3)2
exp
(
ND
λ3PJ
+
NE
ρλ4PJ
)
Γ
(
0,
ND
λ3PJ
+
NE
ρλ4PJ
)
− λ1λ2λ3NE
(ρλ1λ4 − λ2λ3)(λ1NE + λ2ND)
+
(
λ1NE
PJ(ρλ1λ4 − λ2λ3) −
ρλ1λ2λ3λ4
(ρλ1λ4 − λ2λ3)2
)
exp
(
ND
λ3PJ
+
λ1NE
λ2λ3PJ
)
Γ
(
0,
ND
λ3PJ
+
λ1NE
λ2λ3PJ
)
.
(69)
To this end, the desired result can be obtained along with some simple algebraic manipulations.
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Based on (66) and (68), we have
Pout =
1
1 + λ2ND
λ1NE
−
∫ ∞
ND
NE
e
−xNE−ND
λ3PJ
1
1 + ρλ4
λ3
x
λ1λ2
(λ1 + λ2x)
2dx. (70)
When λed →∞, invoking [24, Eq. (1.112.1)] and [24, Eq. (1.112.2)], we have
1
1 + λ2ND
λ1NE
=
NE
λedND
+O
(
1
λ2ed
)
, (71)
and
λ1λ2
(λ1 + λ2x)
2 =
1
λedx2
+O
(
1
λ2ed
)
. (72)
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As such, in the high SNR regime, Pout reduces to
P∞
out
=
NE
λedND
−
∫ ∞
ND
NE
e
−xNE−ND
λ3PJ
1
1 + ρλ4
λ3
x
1
λedx2
dx. (73)
To this end, utilizing [24, Eq. (3.353.1)] and [24, Eq. (3.351.4)] yields the desired result.
APPENDIX E
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Define γse = ||hse||2 and γed = |hedΠ1h†ed|, then it is easy to show that γse follows the chi-
square distribution with 2Nr degrees of freedom, with pdf given by [39]
fse(x) =
xNr−1
λNr2 Γ(Nr)
e
− x
λ2 . (74)
Also, the pdf of γed is given by [38]
fed(x) =
xNt−2
λNt−13 Γ(Nt − 1)
e
− x
λ3 . (75)
As such, the eavesdropping non-outage probability can be written as
E{X} = Prob
(
PS
NE
γse ≥
PS
ND
γsd
PJ
ND
γed + 1
)
. (76)
Conditioned on γse and γed, utilizing [24, Eq. (3.351.1)], we obtain
E{X} = 1− exp
(
−γseND
λ1NE
(
PJ
ND
γed + 1
))
. (77)
Averaging over γse, with the help of [24, Eq. (3.351.3)], we have
E{X} = 1−
(
1 +
λ2ND
λ1NE
(
PJ
ND
γed + 1
))−Nr
. (78)
Finally, substituting (75) into (78) yields
E{X} = 1−
∫ ∞
0
(
λ1NE
λ2PJ
)Nr
(
x+ ND
PJ
+ λ1NE
λ2PJ
)Nr xNt−2λNt−13 Γ(Nt − 1)e−
x
λ3 dx. (79)
31
Making a change of variable t = x+ ND
PJ
+ λ1NE
λ2PJ
and applying the binomial expansion, the desired
result can be obtained with the help of [24, Eq. (3.381.3)].
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Starting from (78), conditioned on γed, utilizing [24, Eq. (1.112.1)] yields
Pout =

 NE
ND
(
1 + PJ
ND
γed
)
λed

Nr (1 +O( 1
λed
))Nr
. (80)
Omitting the high order items, we obtain
P∞
out
=

 NE
ND
(
1 + PJ
ND
γed
)
λed

Nr . (81)
To this end, invoking [24, Eq. (3.381.3)], the desired result can be obtained.
APPENDIX G
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Define γee =
|h†seHeeh†ed|2
||hse||2||hed||2 , then the key task is to derive the pdf of γee, which we do in the
following. Let p =
Heeh
†
ed
||hed|| , then according to [40], the elements of Nr × 1 vector p are i.i.d.
zero-mean complex Gaussian random variables with variance λ4, and p is independent of hed.
Now consider the scalar q = h
†
sep
||hse|| , we have
E{q|hse} = h
†
se
||hse||E{p} = 0, (82)
and
E{|q|2|hse} = h
†
seE{pp†}hse
||hse||2 = λ4
h†seINrhse
||hse||2 = λ4, (83)
which imply that q is a zero-mean complex Gaussian random variable with variance λ4. Therefore,
γee = q
∗q follows an exponential distribution with mean λ4.
32
Then, we have
Fa(x) =
∫ ∞
0
∫ xz
0
1
λ1
e
− y
λ1
zNr−1
λNr2 Γ(Nr)
e
− z
λ2 dydz = 1− 1(
1 + λ2
λ1
x
)Nr , (84)
and
Fb(x) =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ρxz
0
yNt−1
λNt3 Γ(Nt)
e
− y
λ3
1
λ4
e
− z
λ4 dydz = 1−
Nt−1∑
k=0
(
ρλ4
λ3
x
)k
(
1 + ρλ4
λ3
x
)k+1 . (85)
Therefore,
I1 + I3 = 1− 1(
1 + λ2ND
λ1NE
)Nr . (86)
Invoking [24, Eq. (3.353.2)] and [24, Eq. (3.352.3)], I4 can be computed as
I4 =
Nt−1∑
k=0
k∑
m=0
1
(k −m)!
∫ ∞
ND
NE
(
xNE −ND
λ3PJ
)k−m
e
−xNE−ND
λ3P
(
ρλ4
λ3
x
)m
(
1 + ρλ4
λ3
x
)m+1 Nr λ2λ1(
1 + λ2
λ1
x
)Nr+1dx.
(87)
To this end, pulling everything together yields the desired result.
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